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I INTRODUCTION 
Motherhood is regarded by many as the essence of womanhood. It is a woman's true 
destiny. Her ultimate fulfilment. The desire to have children of her own, to love them 
selflessly, to put their interests first, and to willingly and happily carry out all domestic 
and childcare responsibilities, is after all, what comes "naturally". That these are myths, 
most people do not deny. But they are myths so deeply rooted in all of us that we have 
unconsciously internalised them. They have become confused with our reality. 
So deeply rooted are these myths, that women who kill their children are regarded as 
subhuman, as sick and evil monsters. 1 They are regarded as having no motive to kill, 
and therefore as "mad." Because they are defined as mad, they are not seen as 
responsible for their child's death. After all, no sane woman would murder her own 
child. These myths are reflected in the crime of infanticide.2 
The crime of infanticide is based upon the proposition that a woman's physiological 
processes linked to childbirth and/or lactation may influence her behaviour in such a way 
that she is not really responsible for her actions, or more specifically for the murder of 
her own child. This view is reflected in the sentencing judgment of a recent New 
Zealand case, where the Judge said of a mother found guilty of infanticide, "you are not 
to regard yourself as being responsible for what happened, .... [t]he fact that you have 
been treated like a criminal does not mean you are one - you are not. "3 Why is the 
mother not responsible for her own child's death? If she is not responsible, then who 
is? The Judge did not say. 
* I wish to thank Brigit Laidler and Lisa Tortell for their invaluable help in the proof reading of this 
paper. 
lThis can be seen in R v Witika [1993) 2 NZLR 424. In this case, Wili.ka and her partner Smith 
appealed against were appealing 5 convictions for the ill-treatment, neglect, and murder of Wili.ka's two 
year old daughter Delcelia. Despite acknowledging that Wili.ka was a battered wife, and that she was 
"dominated physically, mentally and sexually" by Smith, the court refused her a defence of compulsion 
or duress and instead she was portrayed as a wicked and evil mother for neglecting her child. Justice 
Gault in the decision of the court said, "[t]he position of battered women calls for sympathy but can be 
no justification for broadening the grounds on which the law should provide excuses for child abuse." 
2Infanticide is defined as "the murder or killing of an infant soon after its birth" in J Nolan and J 
Nolan-Haley (eds) Black's Law Dictionary (6ed, West Publishing Company, St Paul, 1990) 778. 
Infanticide is also the intentional placing of one's child in a situation where death would be assured. see 
K Moseley "The History of Infanticide in Western Society" (1986) 1 Issues in Law and Medicine 345. 
The term "infanticide" means a variety of things in a variety of contexts. Some use it when speaking of 
neonaticide which is the killing of a newly born baby within the day of its birth. Some speak of the 
mercy killing of disabled children as infanticide. Some use it when talking of cultural practices that 
require the killing of female children. The killing of disabled newly borns and cultural infanticide is 
outside the scope of this paper. Neonaticides will be included in the definition of infanticide in this 
paper unless specifically excluded. The term "infanticide" in this paper will be used to refer to the 
crime of infanticide rather than the act of a mother killing her child, unless otherwise stated. 
3R vWilliams Unreported, 22 April 1992, High Court Auckland Registry T261/91, 1-2. 
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I am not a mother, although one day I may be. I write about infanticide because, in the 
words of Ann Jones, "[t]he story of women who kill is the story of women." 
4 I write 
about infanticide because, although the incidence of mothers killing their children is 
comparatively rare, the lives of all women are touched by the belief that "normal" 
women do not kill their children, and by the supposed irrationality and 
incomprehensibility of the act. I write this because, like Ann Jones, I see direct 
connections between the myths surrounding motherhood and infanticide. 
In this paper, I examine the crime of infanticide to answer the many unanswered 
questions about the real reasons why women kill their children. I do this in the hope of 
showing how the crime of infanticide may one day be prevented from occurring. In 
doing this, I first trace the history of the English crime of infanticide, and show how 
English infanticide law has been adopted in New Zealand. I then discuss the challenges 
to the crime of infanticide by the medical profession and I also discuss the reforms to the 
crime proposed by several different law reform bodies. However, in the next sections I 
reveal that the reform proposals suggested by these law reform bodies fail to address the 
real reasons why women kill their children. I suggest that this may be due to false 
perceptions of female criminality and the perceived need for lenient judicial and societal 
treatment for these women. I conclude by suggesting that, contrary to the common belief 
that mothers who kill their children are mentally disturbed, these mothers are merely 
responding in an understandable way to particular expectations imposed on them by the 
society in which we live. Expectations which they cannot meet. 
II A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF INFANTICIDE IN 
ENGLAND 
The practice of infanticide,5 many believe, is as old as time.6 It was viewed in pre-
Christian and non-Christian societies, as a morally and legally acceptable means of 
controlling population size.7 In Plato's and Aristotle's time it was generally accepted for 
population and eugenic reasons, and was in some instances seen as a service for the 
4A Jones Women Who Kill (Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, New York, 1980) 5. 
51 refer here to the act of a mother killing her child and not the crime of infanticide. 
6It is estimated that paleolithic parents actually killed as many as 50% of their newborn females.see J 
Osbourne "The Crime oflnfanticide: Throwing the Baby Out With the Bathwater" (1987) 6 Canadian J 
Family Law 47, 55. In Greco-Roman times the infanticide of children born outside marriage, females 
or excess children was a common occurrence.See Moseley, above n 2, 349. 
7B McLachlin "Crime and Women - Feminine Equality and the Criminal Law" [1991) U BC LR 1, 
2. 
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state, as the state desired small families. 8 In France, as late as the seventeenth century, 
infanticide was arguably the principle means of birth control.9 In New Zealand, it has 
been recorded that Maori in the early nineteenth century practiced infanticide.10 
The general acceptance of the practice infanticide was condoned as sensible for a variety 
of reasons, primarily because society had not yet developed ways of dealing with 
children who were not planned for, or could not be cared for by their mothers or 
parents. The large numbers of unplanned and unwanted children were undoubtedly the 
result of the ineffectiveness or unavailability of methods of fertility control. 11 Disposing 
of these babies or the taking of their lives in these circumstances was seen as an 
acceptable last resort, when raising the child was impossible. This was often the case 
when an unmarried woman, or young girl, found herself pregnant and could not, or 
would not, get an abortion. 12 Here, infanticide was a way of avoiding the social stigma 
of illegitimacy. In this sense infanticide was a type of delayed contraception or 
abortion. 13 
Infanticide was also condoned because the fragility of infant life in an era of limited 
medical knowledge, created an environment where the death of a newborn was a feature 
of daily life. Deliberate child killing was also regarded as less reprehensible than it is 
now .14 It was believed that the loss to the child's family was not great, and that the 
injury done to a child was less than to an adult for it was incapable of the kind of 
suffering which might be undergone by an adult victim of a murder. 15 The crime of 
infanticide was also not thought to create the sense of insecurity in society which other 
murders caused, especially as the motive was frequently just the concealment of shame 
of the birth of an illegitimate child rather than a malicious killing. 16 
With the advent of Christianity, the practice of infanticide was morally censured. 17 This 
moral censure, however, had little real effect on the continuation of the practice of 
8c Backhouse "Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts: Infanticide in Nineteenth Century 
Canada" (1984) 34 University of Toronto U 447; Mosely, above n 2, 349. 
9 Above n8, Backhouse, 447. 
10 A Crosby Ecological Imperialism and the Expansion of Europe 900 - 1900 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1986) 232. 
11 Above n 8, Backhouse, 476. 
12K O'Donovan "The Medicalisation of Infanticide" [1984] Crim L R 259, 260. 
13c Gardner "Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting Away With Murder?" (1990) 24 
New England LR 953, 956. 
14 Above n 8, Backhouse, 476. 
151 Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law (6 ed, Butterworths, London, 1983) 362. 
16Above n 15, 362. 
17 Above n6, Osbourne, 49. 
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infanticide. 18 It is arguable that infanticide was indirectly sanctioned because of the 
existence of foundling homes. 19 These homes required large numbers of wet nurses to 
provide milk for the unwanted children the homes looked after. Obviously, a wet nurse 
can only provide milk if she has recently given birth herself. Yet, by feeding her own 
child, the less milk she had available to sell. It is argued therefore, that it was in the wet 
nurse's best interests to either abandon, or kill her own children to increase her 
income. 20 
It was not until the nineteenth century, the post-enlightenment period, that there began in 
the upper and middle classes the beginnings of a concerted public outcry in opposition to 
the practice of infanticide.21 Before this outcry, however, legal sanctions were in place. 
The first statute to create a crime of infanticide was the Stuart Bastard Neonaticide Act 
1623 (Eng). This Act was entitled "[a]n Act to prevent the Destroying and Murthering of 
Bastard Children," and was passed to make a woman pay for her sin of adultery and 
fornication which was condemned by the church.22 The Act provided the death penalty 
for the mother of an illegitimate child which had been born alive, and whose body was 
disposed of so as to conceal its death. The offence involved was concealment of death, 
rather than death itself. 23 
Concealment of death led to a presumption of guilt, and of murder.24 In order to rebut 
this presumption, the woman had to present a witness able to give evidence that the child 
was born dead. 25 Due to the secrecy surrounding the pregnancy and the birth, it was 
unlikely that this requirement could ever be fulfilled and the mother's burden of proof 
met.26 In most cases however, the 1623 Act was ignored, due to the reluctance of juries 
to convict for murder in these cases, and the perceived harshness of the Act at the 
time.27 
18Above n 2, Moseley, 357. 
19 Above n 2, Mosely, 359. 
20 Above n2, Moseley, 359. Arguably, wet nurses killed their own children in order to obtain 
employment as a wet nurse in a time of scarce job opportunities for women and of economic 
pressures. 
21 Above n 2, Moseley, 361. 
2221 Jae. 1 C 27. 
23N Walker Crime and Insanity in England Volume One: The Historical Perspective (University 
Press, Edinburgh, 1968) 126. 
24 Above n 12, 259. 
25 Above n 7, 3. 
261 Grossman "Postpartum Psychosis - A Defense to Criminal Responsibility or Just Another 
Gimmick?" (1990) 67 University of Detroit LR 311,313. 
27Between 1730 and 1774, the statute was only specifically mentioned in one of the sixty-one 
infanticide trials at the Old Baily. See Above n 7, McLaucblin. Blackstone said the Act "savours pretty 
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It seems that most women who had committed infanticide were saved from being put to 
death themselves because the jury would grasp at the smallest possible doubt about the 
mother's guilt. Any suggestion that the baby had been still born, had died in the course 
of birth or had been accidentally killed would encourage to jury to acquit.28 A number of 
defences were also developed to help out these woman charged with infanticide and to 
ensure their lenient treatment if they were going to be convicted. 
The "privy defence" was accepted where the mother had been taken by surprise while on 
the privy, and the baby suddenly came, and fell onto the soil. Another was the "benefit 
of linen" defence, where the advance preparation of baby clothes was taken to show that 
the child had been wanted.29 Other defences were the "want of help" defence where it 
was shown that the baby had been wanted as prior arrangements for a midwife to be 
present at the birth had been made, and a defence that the mother was incapacitated after 
the birth and therefore prevented from caring for the child or seeking help.30 In rare 
cases where the jury could not ignore the facts that unmistakeably pointed to murder, 
they could recommend the mother to mercy. If the judge was in favour of mercy, a 
reprieve was assured.31 
Arguably the reason for this lenient treatment was because juries perceived infanticidal 
mothers as victims rather than criminals.32 Infanticide was seen as a result of a society 
which condemned unwed motherhood, while persisting in sexual practices that imposed 
it on women. Many women prosecuted for infanticide were domestic servants who had 
become pregnant by their employer, or by their employer's son.33 
Nineteenth century reforms attempted to remedy the problem of virtual non-enforcement 
of the 1623 Act, but with little real success. In 1803, the Neonaticide Act 1623 was 
replaced by Lord Ellenborough's Act which treated infanticide the same as any other 
strongly of severity." W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England Vol IV (1775) 198 cited 
in Above n 12, 260. 
28 Above n 23, 128. 
29 Above n 7, 3. 
30 Above n 6, Osbourne,50. 
3l Above n 23,128. By tbe time of the Capital Punishment Commission of 1864-6, it was established 
practice in the Home Office to advise the commutation of the death penalty when a woman was 
convicted of murdering her own child while it was under 1 year old. 
32The term "infanticidal mother" will be used throughout this paper to mean mothers who have killed 
their children. 
33 A large proportion of the women prosecuted for infanticide were domestic servants who bad become 
pregnant due to seduction and/or rape by their employer or bis sons. Knowledge of her pregnancy would 
have resulted in immediate dismissal, she would have received no character reference and there would be 
little chance of her being taken into service again.The future job security even more necessary by the 
presence of a child, loss of marriage prospects, and social ostracism of these women was seen to make 
their cases particularly hopeless and therefore compassion was exercised. Above n 12; above n 7, 
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homicide case. There was still however, the common problem of acquittal , due to the 
m lack of proof that the child was born alive, and also due to the establishment of a 
lesser crime of concealment. 34 
The crime of concealment was contained in a provision, which provided that a woman 
could be acquitted of murder if the jury found a concealment of the birth, for which the 
woman could be separately charged.35 Concealment was favoured as it did not involve 
the same difficulties of proof of live birth as murder did, and because it allowed for the 
sympathetic treatment of women accused of murdering their children.36 
Concealment had a maximum two year sentence and became the charge favoured in the 
nineteenth century, even though most courts realised the charge should be murder.37 
Katherine O'Donovan writes that concealment trials increased three fold between the 
1830s and 1860s, because juries would not convict while infanticide was punished 
capitally. It is believed that, most cases of concealment, were in fact cases of murder.38 
The two year penalty for concealment however, was no doubt sufficient to satisfy the 
juror who thought that the mother deserved some degree of punishment, rather than 
acquittal. 39 
A change of direction in infanticide law came with the Infanticide Act 1922 (UK). This 
new approach involved what has come to be called the "medicalisation" of infanticide,40 
as the 1922 Act codified the popular belief that a woman who killed her new born baby 
was suffering from a medical disorder.41 Fitzjames Stephen's account of this popular 
belief reads: 42 
The operation of the criminal law presupposes in the mind of the person who is acted upon a 
normal state of strength, reflective power, and so on, but a woman after child-birth is so upset, 
and in such a hysterical state altogether that it seems to me you cannot deal with her in the 
same manner as if she was in a regular and proper state of health. 
34Above n 12,0Donovan, 261. 
35The Offences Against the Person Act 1863 expanded the crime of concealment expanded to include 
legitimate children as well as illegitimate.see M Lentz "A Postmortem of the Postpartum Psychosis 
Defence" (1989) 18 Capital University LR 525, 528. 
360 Seaborne Davis, "Child Killing in English Law" [1937) Mod LR 203, 213 . 
37 Above n 35, 528; Above n 26, 314. 
38Above n 12, 261. O'Donovan writes that in evidence presented to the Commission on Capital 
Punishment in 1866, Byles J stated his belief that almost every case tried for concealment was a case of 
murder and that there were 5000 coroner's inquests a year on children under seven in the mid-nineteenth 
century, yet only 39 convictions for child murder between 1849 and 1864. 
39 Above n 23, 126. 
40 See generally above n 12. 
41 Above n 26, 315. 
421 Fitzjames Stephen British Parliamentary Papers Vol 21 (1866) 291. 
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The Act, endorsing this popularly held medical belief, reduced the offence from murder 
to manslaughter where a woman caused the death of her newly-born child by any wilful 
act or omission and,43 
at the time of the act or omission sbe bad not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to 
such child, but by reason thereof the balance of ber mind was then disturbed. 
Some commentators believe that the 1922 Act at last recognised the legitimacy of the 
psychological after-effects associated with giving birth.44 In contrast O'Donovan 
argues, that medical theory simply provided a convenient reason for changing the law. 
She states that the new Act was necessary because juries would not pronounce the death 
sentence on the mothers convicted of murdering their children. The court by adopting a 
medical basis to the crime was not, therefore, reflecting current medical theory but 
merely wished to avoid the "solemn mockery" involved in a murder trial when all parties 
knew that the sentence would never be carried out even if it was handed down.45 
In order to reflect the previous lenient treatment of these women in the courts, the 
drafters focused on the barely perceived medical reasons for the women's behaviour 
which had the apparent advantage of being scientific and individually rooted.46 They 
made no attempt to recognise the socio-economic factors previously associated with 
infanticide and the act of concealment. Although this medical theory could not be 
substantiated, it was used as a tool to show mercy on infanticidal mothers. As 
Lansdowne argues: 47 
Infanticide became a crime more closely linked to insanity than to concealment of birth. The 
mother's state of mind, wbicb was initially convenient shorthand for the whole range of 
distressing circumstances surrounding a concealed illegitimate pregnancy and birth, [became] 
the raison d'etre of the offence. 
Lansdowne's comment shows that the "medicalisation" of infanticide, rather than simply 
providing a way for the courts to continue to give lenient treatment to infanticidal 
mothers, actually resulted in a substantially different crime. The Act focused now, not 
on the mother's circumstances surrounding the birth of her child, but on her state of 
mind. As will be seen later on in the paper, this different focus lead to a completely 
431nfanticide Act 1922 (UK) s 1(1). 
44For example Above n 26, 315. 
45 Above n 12, 261. O'Donovan quotes Seabourne Davies wbo also says that, "the act was the product, 
not of nineteenth century medical theory about the effects of childbirth, but of judicial effort to avoid 
passing death sentences which were not going to be [carried out]." 
46 Above n 6, Osbourne, 54. 
47R Lansdowne "Infanticide: Psychiatrists in the Plea Bargaining Process" (1990) 16 Monash 
University LR 41, 47. 
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different perception of the crime and of female criminality, by both the judiciary and the 
public. 
The new focus of the 1922 Act also began to cause definitional problems. One problem 
was the definition of "newly born". This issue was highlighted in the R v O'Donoghue 
where the defendant killed her 35 day old child.48 In this case the Judge ruled that while 
there was evidence of insanity, there was none of infanticide, since the child could not 
be said to be newly born. The defendant was sentenced to death but was swiftly 
reprieved. 49 
In another case, R v Hale, a mother killed her second child when it was three weeks 
old and then inflicted injuries on herself.50 The medical evidence was that at the birth of 
her first child the mother had symptoms bordering on puerperal insanity and therefore it 
was likely she also suffered from some type of insanity at the birth of her second 
child.51 The Judge, however, claimed he was bound by O'Donoghue as the child here 
was three weeks old, and could no_t therefore be said to be a newly born. The Judge 
directed the jury to find the defendant guilty.52 
A bold attempt to widen the scope of this legislation came in an Infanticide Bill 1936 
(UK). This Bill would have meant that women found guilty of killing their infants up to 
the age of eight years would not have been sentenced to death.53 The Bill also widened 
the definition of the mother's state of mind to include, "distress and despair arising from 
solicitude for her child or extreme poverty or other causes" .54 The Bill, however, lapsed 
before it could become law. A new Bill was introduced which was substantially 
different from the 1936 Bill and it was this new Bill that became the Infanticide Act 1938 
(UK). The new Bill was merely an amended version of the Infanticide Act 1922. 
The Infanticide Act 1938 is still in force in England. Section 1(1) states:55 
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child under the age of 
twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by 
reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by 
48(1927) 20 Cr App R 132. 
49 Above n23, 131. 
50The Times, 22 July 1936, 13. 
5lsee below n 87 and 96 - 99 for a definition of puerperal (psychosis) insanity. 
52 Above n 12, 262. 
53Walker suggests that the age limit was set at eight years as recent legislation bad made this the 
earliest age at which a child could be found guilty of a criminal offence. Although the logic of adopting 
it for the Bill was not clear, Walker could think of no other explanation. See above n23, 137. 
54 Above n23, 132. 
55rnfanticide Act 1938 (UK) s 1(1). 
I I 
reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then notwithstanding 
that the circumstances were such that the offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be 
guilty ... of infanticide and may ... be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the 
offence of manslaughter of the <>hild. 
As seen in the section above, the 1938 Act reformed the 1922 Act in two ways. The 
definition of a victim of infanticide has been altered from newly born to "under the age 
of twelve months," and the "medicialisation" of the crime has been extended through the 
addition of language about the effect of "lactation".56 These changes make it clear that it 
is the process of giving birth and the effect of this on the mother's body and hormonal 
processes that gives rise to infanticide.57 
The statute no longer refers to cases of young, desperate women who conceal their 
pregnancies and kill their babies out of fear of social disgrace and poverty.58 In these 
cases, the newly born age limitation was adequate as concealment of the child usually 
took place within a few days of the birth. After the 1938 Act however, where the basis 
of the Act centres around the mother's temporary insanity after the birth, and not on 
concealment of it, extension of the age to twelve months was necessary.59 This 
extension was further justified by a reference to the supposedly disturbing effects of 
lactational insanity.60 
Although, on its face, the 1938 Act did no more than extend the protection already 
afforded under the 1922 Act, it in fact radically altered it.61 As the Act is now based on 
a medical, rather than a socio-economic model of the crime, infanticide law now applies 
to two quite different types of homicide - "neonaticides"62 and the homicide of older 
babies. Both types of killing are explained by the physical and mental processes of the 
mother, related either to chemistry or hysteria, experienced after childbirth. Evidence of 
such a condition or perhaps a presumption of one, reduces the woman's criminal 
responsibility. 63 
56Above n 12,261. Lactation is the period during which a woman breastfeeds. 
57 Above n 12, 262. 
58Above n 47, 47. 
59 Above n 47, 47. 
60Above n 47, 47. 
61Above n 47, 47. 
62Neonaticide refers to the situation where the mother is usually not mentally disturbed, but is 
distressed by the immediate physical consequences of giving birth alone and unattended. See above n 
47, 47. 
63 Above n 12, 262. It bas also been said that these statutory provisions were enacted not to legally 
recognise the connection between childbirth and infanticide, but to create it. See above n 6, Osbourne, 
55. 
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• III CONSEQUENCES OF THE INFANTICIDE ACT 1938 (UK) 
Even accepting at face value the medical assumptions underlying the crime of 
infanticide, inconsistencies appear due to the limited ambit of the crime. Why does the 
Act only apply to victims under one year of age by an arbitrary cut off point ? There is 
no evidence that the effects of childbirth, medical or otherwise, disappear miraculously 
after twelve months. 64 It is also not clear why killing of other children by the mother 
are excluded. What about children adopted by the mother? Further, if her mind is 
disturbed by childbirth or lactation, does it matter that she kills the youngest child, the 
oldest, her partner or even a complete stranger ? 
In England, if a mother kills any other than her youngest child under twelve months, she 
will be charged with murder. What if her child under twelve months is not killed but 
severely maimed? As there is no such thing as attempted infanticide, the mother may be 
charged with attempted murder. 65 Infanticide as defined in England, is also criticised 
because it is a gender-specfic crime and also a biologically-specific crime, in that can 
only be committed by fertile women. This creates inconsistencies in the treatment of 
male and female offenders and between non-biological mothers and those who have 
given birth. The New Zealand crime of infanticide, based on its English counterpart, 
raises some similar problems. 
IV THE HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF INFANTICIDE IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
The crime of infanticide was first introduced in New Zealand in section 178 of the 
Crimes Act 1961. There was no infanticide provision in the Crimes Act 1908. The 
infanticide provision in the 1961 Act is based on the English legislation, but it is much 
wider in scope and more comprehensive in detail.66 Section 178(1) states: 
Where a woman causes the death of any child of hers under the age of ten years in a manner that 
amounts to culpable homicide, and where al the time of the offence the balance of her mind was 
disturbed, by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or 
any child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder consequent upon 
64see below Part V. 
651n New Zealand, she may be charged with causing actual bodily harm to her infant child under s 195 
Crimes Act 1961. In Ericsson v Police Unreported, 31 March 1993, High Court Wellington 
Registry AP 52/93 the appellant was found guilty under s 195 Crimes Act 1961 and sentenced to four 
months imprisonment. This can be contrasted with the infanticide case Williams where the defendant 
was sentenced to two years supervision. See above n3 . 
661 Garrow and G Turkington (eds) Criminal Law in New 7.ealand (7ed, Butteiworths, Wellington, 
1991) 288. 
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childbirth or lactation, to such an extent that she should not be held fully responsible, she is 
guilty of infanticide, and not murder or manslaughter, and is liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 3 years. 
As the New Zealand legislation is based on English infanticide law, it has adopted 
apparently without question the "medicalisation" approach to infanticide.67 New 
Zealand criminal law statutes have always had provisions concerning the crime of 
concealment, and can be seen therefore, to have mirrored the English development from 
crimes of concealment to crimes of infanticide for essentially the same actions. 
The crime of concealment was first introduced into New Zealand in the Criminal Code 
of 1893. Section 17 4 of the code provided that: 
Everyone is liable to two years imprisonment with hard labour who disposes of the dead body 
of any child in any manner with intent to conceal the fact that its mother was delivered of it 
whether the child died before, or during, or after birth. 
The Crimes Act 1908, retained the concealment provision, except that two years hard 
labour was substituted with two years imprisonment.68 The concealment provision is 
still in force in New Zealand today in the Crimes Act 1961 with a penalty "not exceeding 
two years." 69 The Crimes Bill 1989 however, contains no clause on concealment. In 
contrast to concealment, the crime of infanticide was not given any consideration in New 
Zealand until the late 1950s. 
During 1956 and 1957 a preliminary draft for the revision of the Crimes Act 1908 was 
prepared by a committee on the instructions of the Minister of Justice.70 This 
preliminary draft was then reviewed extensively by an enlarged committee,71 and from 
this, a Bill was prepared and introduced in the House of Representatives in 1957. The 
1957 Bill contained no infanticide clause. 
With a change of government in 1958, Sir George Finlay (the senior puisine Judge of 
the Supreme Court) was invited to examine the 1957 Bill. In examining the Bill, he took 
account of comments from judges, law societies and members of the medical and legal 
profession, and produced an improved version of the Bill. Finlay's examination of the 
Bill led to an infanticide clause being added in what became the Crimes Bill 1959. In 
67see above p 6-10. 
68 Crimes Act 1908 s194. 
69 Crimes Act 1961 s181. 
7°'rhe exact membership of the committee is noted in the explanatory note of the Crimes Bill 1959. 
71 Above n 70. 
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Finlay's report on his additions and improvements to the Bill, he said of the crime of 
infanticide: 72 
There bas been necessity for some such clause as this. Prosecutions for homicide in those cases 
to which the clause will apply have invariably ended in acquittal, quite contrary to the justice of 
the case in many instances and althougb .... the clause will doubtlessly always end in immediate 
discharge, for, at the time of the trial, the woman is always completely sane, as I have believed 
in the past and as psychiatrists assure me, it is better to have order and regularity and 
consistency in the administration of the Criminal Law rather than verdicts which offend against 
the spirit of the law. 
Finlay was clearly following the "solemn mockery" line of argument here, that held 
sway in England. 73 Rather than the judge and jury having to strain their judicial oaths in 
order to acquit the women of murder, Finlay thought it best to charge the women with a 
lesser crime and thereby maintain regularity and consistency within the law. The fact that 
the clause was focused on the medical condition of the mother after the birth of her child 
seems not to have been the considered or overriding factor in adding the clause to the 
Bill as far as I am able to ascertain. A similar position existed in England.74 Apart from 
Finlay's comment above, I can find no other record of why infanticide was added to the 
1959 Bill.75 
The new infanticide clause for the first time created a separate offence of infanticide. 
Clause 188(1) provided:76 
Where a woman causes the death of any child of hers under sixteen in a manner amounting to 
culpable homicide, she is guilty of infanticide with a maximum of three years imprisonment, 
and not murder or manslaughter, if at the time the balance of her mind was disturbed, by reason 
of the effect of childbirth, to such an extent that she could not be held fully responsible. (my 
emphasis) 
This 1959 Bill lapsed and another Bill was introduced in 1960. The 1960 Bill was 
substantially similar to the 1959 Bill and was reviewed by the Statutes Revision 
Committee. The infanticide provision in the 1960 Bill was similar to the clause in the 
72G Finlay Repon on the 1957 Crimes Bill (Justice Department, Wellington, 1958) 82. 
73see above p 7. 
74see above p 6 - 9. 
75Tois bas not been through lack of trying as I have undertaken research with the help of Jeremy 
Hammington, Senior Legal Advisor at the Law Reform Division of the Justice Department, the 
National Library of New 2.ealand, the National Archives and also the New 2.ealand Parliamentary 
Library. There was no indication in the files and documents I uncovered in this process on this point. 
However, other documents held elsewhere may contain the answer. 
76Wby is the limit sixteen years ? This age of is significantly different from its English counterpart. I 
can find no concrete indication as to why this was the case. The only possible explanation is in a letter 
from J.L. Robson (Secretary for Justice at the time) to the Minister of Justice 30 March 1960, Justice 
Department File J 18/10/6 part 3. In this letter Robson mentioned a submission made to the Statutes 
Revision Committee on the 1959 Bill which suggests that the significance of the age sixteen was 
chosen because it also appears in the clause on culpable homicide. Age sixteen appears in the current 
culpable homicide section in the Crimes Act 1961. 
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1959 Bill, except for one major change.77 The age of the child was reduced from sixteen 
to ten years. 78 
The only reference I have found for the reason behind this age reduction of the child in 
the infanticide section was in a letter of 1963 by J L Robson, the Secretary for Justice at 
the time. In this letter Robson writes: 79 
The section ... applies to the killing of any child under ten (a necessarily arbitrary age) while the 
Mother's balance of mind is disturbed in the consequences of childbirth. 
This Bill finally became law in 1961 complete with the infanticide section. In the debates 
on the Bill, infanticide was argued as being needed "to avoid the necessity of bringing a 
more serious charge in inappropriate circumstances," as it was said that most people, 
"feel it quite wrong to charge a woman with murder in these circumstances".80 
The New Zealand infanticide provision is much wider than its English counterpart. 
First, the age of the child who is killed may be up to ten years, whereas the English 
section applies only in the case of a child under twelve months. Secondly, the section 
covers the case of a mother who has not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to 
any child of hers, whereas the English section applies only where the mental 
disturbance arises from giving birth to the child killed. The reason for this sensible 
addition may be seen by reference to a 1963 letter found in a Justice Department file. 
The letter states:81 
Our provision is a good deal wider than the English legislation. Some years ago a study was 
made of New Zealand cases where the mothers bad killed their children following childbirth. It 
was found that the victim was often not the newly born child itself but another child. 82 
These wider provisions of the crime of infanticide are demonstrated in R v P. 83 In this 
case, a woman was charged with the murder of a five year old child who was not her 
77This change occurred after the Bill was reported back from the Statutes Revision Committee. 
78c1ause 188. There is no substantive report of the Statutes Revision Committee which might have 
explained the reason for the age change, nor is there any record in the Appendices to the Journals of the 
House of Representatives or any Select Committee Reports. It seems likely that the age of 10 was 
chosen as this is the age at which a child can be charged with a criminal offence in New Zealand. This 
is the same position as in the English Bill of 1936. See above n53 . 
79Letter of J L Robson (Secretary of Justice) to CH Rolph of the New Statesman, London. Justice 
Department File J 18/10/6 part 2. Emphasis added. 
8~ Parliamentary Debates Vol 328, 1961: 2682. 
81 Above n 79. 
821 have not been able to locate the study mentioned in the quote. 
83 (1991) 2 NZLR 116. 
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natural child, but was living with the woman in her home.84 The mother was the child's 
guardian, but not its natural mother. The court held that the defence of infanticide was 
available in respect of all children who in fact, law and common sense could be said to 
be hers. This was because, it would seem strange if the circumstances which would in 
part excuse an act of violence toward her own natural child would not apply to a child 
who in all other respects was a member of the family. 85 
Another reason for the wider interpretation of the infanticide provision in New Zealand 
put forward by Heron J in the case, was that New 2.ealand does not have the defence of 
diminished responsibility. 86 
The New Zealand crime of infanticide is therefore based on its English counterpart with 
the exception of the two differences outlined above. Both Acts, are firmly based on the 
"medicalisation" approach to infanticide. In recent years, however, this medical model 
of the crime, linking childbirth with mental disturbance, has come under increasing 
criticism. 
V THE MEDICAL BASIS OF THE CRIME OF INFANTICIDE 
The medical basis of infanticide revolves around the assumption that a woman who kills 
her baby is suffering from puerperal psychosis. This is a rare and severe mental disorder 
which occurs in about one in five hundred pregnancies87 and affects 0.01 per cent -
0.02 per cent of women within the first two weeks of childbirth.88 The other types of 
84 Above n 66, 288. 
85 Above n 83, 118. 
86 Above n 83, 119. England bas the defence of diminished responsibility . This means that the 
practical importance of the insanity defence bas been reduced by s2 Homicide Act 1957(UK}, under 
which murder may be reduced to manslaughter when abnormality of mind substantially impairs mental 
responsibility. The "abnormality of mind" need not be a generally recognised type of "insanity." 
Perhaps what Heron J meant by bis comment here was that in most cases of murder in England, 
defendants would prefer a conviction for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility 
rather than acquittal by reason of insanity. As New Zealand does not have diminsbed responsibility the 
only option for women wbo do not fall within the infanticide section is to get an acquittal due to 
insanity with the possibility of draconian penalty. Tbus, there is a the need for a wider interpretation of 
the crime of infanticide. See above n 15, 210; J Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker and 
Friend, Wellington, 1992) Ca 23.22. 
87Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand Post Natal Depression (Mental Health Foundation of 
New Zealand, Auckland, undated) 5. 
88see generally A Morris & A Wilcyznski "Rocking the Cradle - Mothers who kill their Children" in 
Birch H (ed) Moving Targets: Women, Murder and Representation (Virago Press, London, 1993) 206-
207; A Wilczynski "Images of Women who Kill Their Infant: The Mad and the Bad (1991) 2 Women 
and Criminal Justice 71, 74-75; S Edwards Women on Trial - A Study of the Female Suspect, 
Defendant and Offender in the Criminal Law &: Criminal Justice System ( Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1984) 95 . 
1 7 
depression commonly associated with child birth are, however, much more common. 
These are the maternity or baby bl_ues, and postnatal depression. 
Maternity blues affect approximately 50-80 per cent of women on the third or fourth day 
after delivery, and it is usually short lived.89 Postnatal depression affects about 10-20 
per cent of mothers and usually lasts longer than a month in the year following 
childbirth, sometimes lasting until while the child is a pre-schooler and beyond.90 
The symptoms of the maternity blues include tiredness, low spirits, tearfulness, anxiety 
and memory difficulties. The causes are uncertain, but are generally thought to be related 
to hormonal changes, and to the birth and post birth environment91 
Postnatal depression is much more serious as it impairs and disables a woman's quality 
of life. Symptoms include extreme and persisting tiredness, tearfulness, depressed 
mood, anxiety, insomnia, lack of concentration, difficulty in coping with the demands 
of baby care, irritability, guilt and negative feelings towards the father and the baby.92 
Forty percent of mothers who develop postnatal depression have these symptoms for 
more than one year. The majority do not seek or receive psychological or medical 
treatment. Most do not know what is wrong and many feel that they are the only ones 
not basking in the supposed "joys of motherhood".93 
Most mothers suffering from postnatal depression do not have previous psychiatric 
histories and are not liable to depression at other times.94 It has been suggested that this 
means this group of women are comprised in the main of women who are overwhelmed 
by the stresses that accompany childbirth and the care of babies.95 
If, on the other hand, the mother is suffering from puerpheral psychosis, she will be 
completely out of touch with reality and her ability to go about her usual life activities 
will be completely disrupted.96 She may have suicidal thoughts, be hostile to those 
around her, and suffer from delusions which often consist of feelings of inability to care 
8%1ental Health Foundation of New Zealand What is Post Natal Depression? (pamphlet produced by 
the Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand, Auckland, undated) 
90Above n 89. 
91 Above n 87, 5. 
92 Above n 87, 6. 
93 Above n 87, 6. 
94Above n 87, 7. 
95Above n 87, 7. 
96Above n 87, 5. 
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for the new baby and of not having enough love for both the father or the child.97 
Common symptoms also include severe depression, guilt, clouding of consciousness, 
bewilderment, panic attacks and paranoia.98 
Unlike a woman suffering from postnatal depression, she will be completely irrational 
and disjointed. She may suffer from hallucinations, nightmares, obsessive religious 
beliefs and delusions. She may be over-active, over-enthusiastic and may exhibit 
excessive behaviour especially when it comes to spending, writing and cleaning. She 
may not need sleep.99 
Studies show that women who develop this severe disorder are, in their family and 
previous histories and personalities, very like women who develop pychoses at other 
times. 100 There is considerable controversy therefore, over whether puerperal psychosis 
is in fact any different from any other type of psychosis, and can therefore be justified as 
a separate diagnostic category. 101 There is certainly some temporal association with 
childbirth as hospital admissions for psychotic disorders are below the expected level 
during pregnancy, but are several times above the expected level in the first three months 
after delivery. 102 It has been suggested however, that stress brought on by difficult 
labours, first deliveries and still births may by associated with increased risk of 
psychosis. 103 
What has become clear recently however, is that despite being the medical and legal 
basis for the crime of infanticide, puerperal psychosis is very rarely the cause of a 
mother killing her child. 104 Estimates are that this occurs only in around five cases a 
year in England. 105 In fact, the mental disturbance used to satisfy the terms of the crime 
of infanticide can vary considerably from puerperal pychosis to postnatal depression, to 
no mental disturbance at all. 106 Studies in England and Hong Kong have found that 
97 Above n 87, 5. 
98Above n 87. See Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand Post Natal (Puerpheral) Psychosis. 
(pamphlet produced by Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand, Auckland, undated) 
99 Above n 98, Post Natal Psychosis pamphlet. 
lOO Above n 87, 6. 
101 Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 207. 
102Above n 87, 6. 
103 Above n 87, 6. 
l04Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 207. 
105 Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynshi, 207. 
l06Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 207. 
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about half the mothers convicted of infanticide could not actually have been described as 
suffering from any mental disorder at all. 107 
It has also been acknowledged, that where an infanticidal woman is recognised as being 
mentally ill, it is not usually of sufficient severity that it would be recognized by the law 
in any other context. For example, it would not be a sufficient basis for a plea of 
diminished responsibility .108 It is, however, largely assumed on the slightest evidence 
that a woman who kills her child under twelve months in England, or ten years in New 
Zealand, is in fact mentally ill within the definition of the crime of infanticide. 109 
Virtually any type of perceived psychiatric, emotional, personality, or mental problem 
whatsoever is interpreted, if psychiatrists and lawyers choose, as the "severe mental 
illness" theoretically required for the crime of infanticide. 110 
Ania Wilczynski argues that, this "fudging" of mental illness is particularly apparent in 
the neonaticide category. 111 Such cases typically involve young, single women from 
poor economic backgrounds who are ignorant about sex and contraception. Usually 
these women conceal their pregnancies and give birth alone without any preparation, in 
what is obviously a very traumatic and emotionally and physically exhausting 
experience. In situations like this, it is false to equate the emotional and physical 
upheaval of the birth with the mental illness that is required by the crime. There is 
normally no evidence of psychosis or mental illness either before or after the birth. 112 
It is clear therefore, that women convicted of killing their children, whether neonaticidal 
or otherwise, are in fact not usually suffering from the mental illness required by the 
crime of infanticide. It is more than likely that these women are suffering, not from 
puerperal pychosis, cases of which occur only very rarely, but from the stresses that 
accompany childbirth and caring for young babies. These women are ordinary mothers 
suffering from severe cases of postnatal depression. 113 
107see generally P d'Orban "Women who Kill their Children" (1979) 134 British J of Psychiatry 560; 
P Cheung "Maternal Filicide in Hong Kong 1971-1985" (1986) 26 Medicine, Science and the Law 
185. I can be no clearer than this here because there has been very little research done on these types of 
depressions, especially in New Zealand. A Pbd in the area is due for publication in late 1993 in New 
Zealand. The author of this Phd has indicated to me that the situation in New Zealand is most likely to 
be the same as that in Hong Kong and England. 
108 Above n 88, Wilczynski, 76. 
109 Above n 88, Wilczynski, 76. 
llOAbove n 88, Wilczynski, 76. 
111 Above n 88, Wilczynski, 76. 
112 Above n 88, Wilczynski, 76. 
l l3see generally above n 87; above n 88. 
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lnfanticidal women's actions reflect the social situations and circumstances in which 
they have found themselves. Their motive for killing their children is not because they 
are biologically unstable, nor because they are mad. They kill because they are 
overwhelmed by the conditions they must face on a daily basis and the expectations they 
must try to meet in order to look after their children and to be "good" mothers. 
Infanticidal mothers are lonely and isolated, they feel powerless and dependent, or they 
may dread the social stigma of an illegitimate child. They have been given almost total 
responsibility for the care of another, but they themselves receive little support, spousal 
or otherwise, from those around them. They may be experiencing economic difficulties, 
and may also have been provided with unrealistic expectations of motherhood. 114 Many 
of these women may have internalised many false myths about the role of mothers and 
motherhood. It is against the background of these ideas that the proposals for reform of 
the crime of infanticide are discussed. 
VI PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF THE CRIME OF 
INFANTICIDE 
In recent years, due to the medical debate outlined above, the Infanticide Act 1938 (UK) 
has become increasingly subject to criticism. In 1975, the Butler Committee on Mentally 
Abnormal Offenders challenged the medicalisation of infanticide when it stated that the 
medical principles on which the act is based were probably no longer relevant. Mental 
illness was no longer considered to be a significant cause of infanticide. 115 
The Committee recognised also that puerperal psychoses are now regarded as no 
different from other psychoses. 116 They accepted that the operative factors in child 
killing are not based on the mother's mental disturbance due to the birth of her child, but 
often relate to "the stress of having to care for the infant, who may be unwanted or 
difficult, and personality problems .... [and that] these stresses affect the father as well as 
the mother, and are not confined to a year after the birth." 117 Consequently, the Butler 
Committee proposed that infanticide could be adequately dealt with by using diminished 
114Aboven 113. 
115Butler Committee - Report of the Convnittee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (1975; Cmnd 
6244) para 19.23. 
116Above n 115, para 19.23. 
117 Above n 115, para 19.23. 
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responsibility introduced in 1957, instead of a separate Infanticide Act 118 The repeal of 
the Infanticide Act was therefore proposed. 119 
In 1980 the medical model of infanticide was challenged again by the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee (CLRC) in its Fourteenth Report. 120 The CLRC agreed with the 
Butler Committee that the medical basis of the Act was probably no longer relevant. 121 
They also accepted that "there [was] little or no evidence for an association between 
lactation and mental disorder," and proposed the reference to lactation be removed from 
the Act 122 In questioning the medical basis of the Act, the CLRC suggested that mental 
disturbances may arise not from giving birth but from "circumstances consequent upon 
the birth".123 
By the phrase "circumstances consequent upon the birth," the CLRC proposed the 
extension of the definition of the crime to cover "environmental or other stresses".124 
These stresses included poverty, incapacity to cope with the child, and failure of 
bonding. 125 The CLRC reforms were therefore based on socio-economic factors rather 
than medical conditions arising from childbirth. 
Regardless of the fact, however, that the CLRC, in agreement with the Butler 
Committee, felt uncomfortable about the medical basis of the 1938 Act, it argued for the 
retention of an expressed medical basis for the crime. The CLRC proposed amending 
the present version of infanticide law to take into account some of the socio-economic 
factors involved in child killing, but, their proposal included leaving the reference to 
118The Butler Committee actually recommended the abolition of the mandatory life sentence for 
murder, thus leaving the judge to suit the sentence to the circumstances of the case. The repeal of the 
Infanticide Act was proposed as this would render it superfluous. If the mandatory sentence was 
retained, the Committee's second choice was for infanticide cases be dealt with under the general defence 
of diminished responsibility. See E Parker and F Good "Infanticide" (1981) 5 Law and Human 
Behaviour 237, 241. However, O'Donovan argues that even if diminished responsibility was used as a 
defence, "there [will] still be pressure in infanticide cases on psychiatrists 'to confo1ID their medical 
opinion to the felt need for mercy,' by giving evidence of medical disorder so as to avoid a conviction 
for murder". O'Donovan suggests that if this is the case, "the current 'stretching' of the law and 
medical principles w[ill] continue, as w[ill] the myths that surround the crime". See above n12, 263. 
119 Above n 115, paras 19.17; 19.22. 
120criminal Law Revision Conunittee - Offences Against the Person (1980; Cmnd 7844) 
121 Above n 120, para 103. 
122Above n 120, para 105. 
123Above n 120, para 105. 
124Above n 120, para 105. 
125Above n 120, para 105. 
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mental disturbance as it was. The CLRC did not propose that infanticide be completely 
redrafted or repealed.126 
A reformulated version of the crime of infanticide along the lines of the CLRC's 
proposal appears in the Draft Criminal Code 1989 (UK). Clause 64(1) of the code 
states:127 
A woman who, but for this action, would be guilty of murder or manslaughter of her child is 
not guilty of murder or manslaughter, but is guilty of infanticide, if her act is done when the 
child is under the age of twelve months and when the balance of her mind is disturbed by reason 
of the effect of giving birth or of circumstances consequent upon the birth. 
The Select Committee who developed the Draft Code were arguably ambivalent as to 
whether the law on infanticide should actually be changed in England. They did suggest, 
however, that the matter should be considered further. 128 
Other jurisdictions outside England have also proposed to reform their infanticide laws. 
In 1984, the Law Reform Commission of Canada's report on homicide contained a 
recommendation that their infanticide provisions be deleted. 129 This recommendation 
was made because the Commission saw little evidence to support the underlying medical 
rationale of the infanticide provision. 130 In doing this, the Canadian Commission 
aligned itself with the recommendation of the Butler Committee. 
In Australia in 1988, following the approach taken in England in the Draft Criminal 
Code, the Law Reform Commission of Victoria, in their Discussion Paper on Mental 
Malfunction and Criminal Responsibility, argued for the retention of the crime of 
infanticide, regardless of whether diminished responsibility was introduced in Victoria 
or not. 131 The Commission based their reforms on the wording of the English Draft 
Criminal Code and saw the retention of the offence as recognition of a "distinctive kind 
126 Abolition was opposed by an unusual coalition of police, lawyers and women's organisations. The 
offence of infanticide bas been defended as "an example of common sense and common knowledge 
triumphing over tidy scientific classification". See above n 120, para 101. 
127 A Criminal Code for F.ngland and Wales Law Com No. 177 (1989) Voll Report and Draft 
Criminal Code Bill. 
128R MacKay "The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children" [1993] Crim LR, 21. 
129 Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper# 33, Homicide (Supply Services Canada, 
Ottawa, 1984). The Canadian infanticide provisions are ss 216 and 590 Canadian Criminal Code. 
130 Above n 6, Osbourne, 48. 
131 Law Reform Commission of Victoria Mental Malfunction and Criminal Responsibility -
Discussion Paper No. 14 (no publisher, Melbourne, 1988) para 198. 
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of human tragedy" .132 Infanticide was regarded as a class of case "where the law can 
take a corn passionate view of a tragic aberration". 133 
In New Zealand, the Crimes Bill 1989 proposes to repeal the present infanticide 
provision in the Crimes Act 1961, and to replace it with a simplified version in clause 
124. Clause 124 is to be called "culpable homicide by mother of child". 134 This clause 
states: 
Where, upon the trial of a woman for culpable homicide of any child of hers under the age of 
10 years, the jury is of the opinion that at the time of the killing the woman was mentally 
disturbed, through not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that child or any 
other child, or through any disorder consequent upon childbirth, to such an extent that she 
should not be held fully responsible for the killing, the jury may return a verdict of culpable 
homicide with mitigating circumstances. 
The Crimes Bill 1989, although repealing the present infanticide provision in the 
Crimes Act 1961, still retains the medical model of the crime of infanticide in its new 
clause. 
In a report by the New Zealand Crimes Consultative Committee on the 1989 Bill, 
however, they say that "the Committee is not attracted to the different approach to 
[infanticide] taken by clause 124." 135 They include in an appendix a redraft of the 
section, to bring clause 124 much closer to the existing infanticide faw. The 
Consultative Committee's clause 124 states: 
Where a woman causes the death of any child of hers under the age of 10 years in a manner 
that amounts to murder or culpable homicide, and where at the time of the offence the woman 
was mentally disturbed, through not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to 
that or any other child, or through any disorder consequent upon childbirth, to such an extent 
that she should be held responsible, she is guilty of infanticide, and not murder or culpable 
homicide. 
The Committee went on to say, "if the policy is kept in order to reduce the jeopardy of a 
mother who kills her child while suffering from the effects of childbirth, the legislation 
should retain a specific offence of infanticide." 136 This was because the rules on 
insanity and the availability of a plea of mitigation on sentence for manslaughter 
proposed in the Bill did not cater for infanticidal women. 137 The Committee saw no 
132Above n 131, para 199. 
133Above n 131, para 197. 
134c1ause 124 Crimes Bill 1989. 
135Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee (Government Printer, Wellington, 1991) 54. 
136Above n 135, 54. 
13 7 Above n 135, 54. 
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compelling reason to alter the policy established in 1961 by recommending the abolition 
of the crime of infanticide.138 
The reform proposal of the Consultative Committee is unique, as it does not propose to 
repeal the infanticide provision, nor does it propose to adopt the social factors evident in 
the CLRC's formulation of infanticide. The Crimes Consultative Committee's 
recommendation is instead to retain the medical model of the crime. 
Similarly, the proposal contained in the Crimes Bill 1989, although repealing the old 
infanticide provisions, has firmly retained the medical model of the crime. The New 
Zealand reform process therefore, results in no substantial change in focus from the 
infanticide provisions contained in the Crimes Act 1961. 
In summary, the reform process in England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as 
seen in the discussion above, has put forward two distinct possibilities for the reform of 
the crime of infanticide. One possibility is to repeal the crime. The other is to keep it as it 
is, with little, if any change, except for the possible addition of some socio-economic 
factors. 
The proposal to repeal the crime seems intially progressive, considering the recognition 
of the flawed medical basis of the crime. The proposed addition of socio-economic 
factors also seems progressive. After closer examination, however, and exposure of the 
crimes long established roots it is clear that retention of the medical basis of the 
crime139 or even its repeal will have little positive effect in the reform process. 140 This 
is because there can be no successful reform of the crime of infanticide until those who 
propose the reforms to the crime begin to acknowledge and to understand the real 
reasons why women kill their children. Until this happens, the repeal of the crime or 
the addition of socio-economic factors, will have little effect on the perception of the 
crime as a whole, because infanticidal mothers will continue to be, as they have always 
been, victims. They will be victims, not only of their social position, but of the theories 
of female criminality which pathologise their behaviour. 
138 Above n 135, 54. 
139Retention of the medical basis of infanticide was proposed by the CLRC, the Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria, and the New Zealand Crimes Consultative Committee. 
140Above n 6, Osbourne, 59. 
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VII THE PATHOLOGISATION OF INF ANTICIDAL MOTHERS 
Should we treat you as a wicked person responsible for her actions ... . or as someone who was 
sick? 141 
The comparatively small numbers of infanticide cases brought before the criminal 
justice system means that infanticidal mothers brought before the courts, are regarded 
as deviant and as "abnormal" members of the female sex. These women by killing their 
children have committed crimes, not against the state but against their own family, and 
they are therefore considered to be "mad". This classification of infanticidal mothers as 
"mad" forms a theory about female criminality which pathologises the mother who kills 
her child.142 The theory is based on the fact that the crime of infanticide is perceived to 
be so heinous and in such direct contradiction to women's natural role of wife and 
mother, that the act of a mother killing her child can surely have only one explanation -
madness. 143 
In infanticide cases, where a mother has out of shame or poverty killed her child, or 
where from physical exhaustion induced by lack of support and community services 
she takes the life of her newborn, her experience is not validated in the legal system or 
in society as a whole. Instead, the woman is pathologised because it is much easier and 
less politically disturbing for an infanticidal mother to be seen in this way. 144 This 
"pathologisation" enables the meaning of the act of a woman who kills her child to be 
141R v Ricketts Unreported, May 1989, Central Criminal Court, London, observed by Ania 
Wilczynski cited in above n88, Wilczynski, 71. 
142Toe classification of women criminals as either mad or bad, has been identified by Susan Edwards 
as being dependent on the "typicality" of the crimes women commit. Crimes typically committed by 
women have been identified as offences like theft, shoplifting, benefit fraud and forgery . These crimes 
are acceptable for women to commit, especially if they are doing them for the benefit of their family or 
children. Here, where the woman is conforming to the appropriate domestic stereotype of devoted wife 
and mother, the legal system is more than likely to respond to the women's plight in a sympathetic and 
lenient manner. Untypical crimes for women are robbery, terrorism and crimes outside the family 
domain . Women who commit these sorts of crimes are regarded as bad. In these situations, custodial 
sentences are imposed and so are medical and psychiatric sentences.The women who are regarded as 
mad, however, are those who commit crimes not against the state, but against their male partners and 
children. See generally S Edwards "Neither Bad nor Mad: The Female Violent Offender Reassessed" 
(1986) 9 Women's Studies lnt Forum 79. 
143 Women who commit such 'untypical' crimes are considered ill in the true sense. Within 
criminological ideologies and ideologies of femininity there is no room for the belief that the 
infanticidal mother's response may be a 'normal' response to a violent situation or indeed be like 
terrorism, the last and only resort. See above nl42, 80. 
144 Above nl42, 80. Carol Smart has identified a pathological model of female criminality where it is 
assumed that criminal action is irrational, illogical and without meaning for the actor. The socio-
economic structure of society is seen to have little or no influence on the nature or degree of criminal 
activity. The crime is an individual rather than a social phenomenon and it denies the significance of 
will or intention of the actor. See C Smart Women, Crime And Criminology: A Feminist Critique 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul. London, 1976) 147-8. 
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lost in a portrayal of madness and she is portrayed as a sick and vile monster. 145 
Infanticidal mothers are seen in this way even thought it is now acknowledged that 
puerperal psychosis or insanity is very rarely the cause of a mother killing her child. 
Studies recognised by some of the law reform bodies discussed in this paper, have 
proved that most women are not suffering from any mental disorder at all. 146 
The pathologisation of infanticidal mothers, punishes these women for stepping beyond 
the bounds of their traditional sex-role expectations, and their acts of violence are 
explained away by reference to their hormones (biology) or emotions (irrationality). A 
kind of temporary madness is deemed to exist, and is shown to account for these 
women's actions if they act in contradiction to their expected roles. This enables the 
issue of an infanticidal mother's responsibility to disappear, as she was out of control 
and could not help what she did.147 
The reason infanticidal mothers are portrayed like this is because in the myths 
surrounding motherhood, the love a mother gives to and for her child is supposed to be 
the most natural thing in the world. It is what women are for, and includes everything 
up to the point of self sacrifice. A woman who does not love her child to this point 
cannot be called a proper mother, she must be mad and sick, she must be suffering 
from some type of insanity. If she kills her baby she cannot have any reason for doing 
it except madness, and madness is illness, lack of reason, and madness is 
motivelessness. 148 
Hilary Allen goes further when she argues that the initial pathologisation of infanticidal 
mothers provides the opportunity for a further manoeuvre: the naturalisation of the 
crime.149 Allen explains that being mad displaces these women from the realm of the 
culpable to such an extent, that an infanticidal mothers act is rewritten as a mere event in 
nature, an occurrence of the natural state of womanhood for which no exceptional cause 
145 Above n142, 82-86. 
l46see generally Above n 88, Morris and Wilcyznski; above n 107, d'Orban; above n 107, Cheung. 
147 Above n 88, Birch, 4. 
148Above n 88, Birch, 69. That this is the case can be seen in the way that women's offending is 
explained in different ways to men's. Hilary Allen suggests in her research based on an examination of 
psychiatric reports prepared for women and men convicted of violent crime, that while reports on 
female offenders focused on their mental states, reports on men focused more on their behaviour and 
lifestyle. Allen says that this was not because of the differences between men's and women's offending 
but because reports of female offenders were prepared within a context which placed all women, not 
just female offenders, within the discourse of the pathological. See generally H Allen Justice 
Unbalanced (Open University Press, Ox.ford, 1987). 
149H Allen "Rendering them Harmless: The Professional Portrayal of Women Charged with Serious 
Crimes" in P Carlen P and A Worrall (eds) Gender, Crime and Justice (Open University Press, Milton 
Keynes, 1987) 85. 
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need be sought.150 The activation of her other statuses as housewife, mother and wife, 
undermines the very possibility of treating her as dangerous. 
Infanticidal mothers perceived in this way are seen as victims in need of sympathy, 
support and most of all, psychiatric treatment. 151 This is because such an act cannot be 
the act of a "normal" woman. She cannot have been fully responsible for her actions. 
She must need help or treatment because a violent woman is a mad woman, and a mad 
woman is a sick woman in need of treatment 152 
In summary, infanticidal mothers are pathologised and are portrayed as being "mad" 
because they kill their children. This pathologisation deprives an infanticidal mother's 
act of any meaning as all inquiries into the death of her child end with the mother's 
assumed madness. In tum she is regarded as needing lenient treatment, not punitive 
sanction. While the consequences of this lenient treatment for individual women may be 
beneficial in the short term, as few want to see them imprisoned, in the long term, there 
are several costs and many prices for which - arguably - all women pay.153 
VIII THE PRICE OF PATHOLOGISATION OF INFANTICIDAL 
MOTHERS. 
The first price of pathologisation is that infanticidal mothers and indeed, all women, are 
believed to be potentially mad during and after childbirth, and at other times in their 
lives, for example at menstruation. Women in these "ordinary states of womanhood," 
are subject to stereotypical beliefs about these states, and these beliefs are used against 
all women. This is because the lives of all women are touched by society's expectations 
of women's behaviour at different times in their lives. 
When a woman commits an act of violence, the legal system by explaining her 
behaviour in terms of madness, or illness, effectively deprives the act of any meaning. 
There is deemed an absence of intention, of will, and of responsibility for action. 
Hilary Allen puts it like this: "[t]he crime 'develops', the 'tragic events' follow, she can 
l50Above n 149, 84. 
l5 l Above n 149, 85. 
152Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 206. 
153Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 215. 
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do nothing 'to prevent a further tragedy from occurring"' .154 The woman offender is 
"rendered harmless"; she is a "legal invalid".155 
The second price that inf anticidal mothers and other women pay, is that all women are 
perceived to be born wives and mothers. 156 This centres around the "myth of 
motherhood" identified by Ann Oakley,157 and also around the meaning given to 
motherhood within the patriarchy's social structure. Women who step outside of these 
strictly defined and guarded gender roles and abuse or kill their children are seen as 
mad. They are seen as mad and in need of help to be shaped into a perfect wife and 
mother, the qualities of which their "mental" illness has deprived them. No "normal" 
wife or mother kills her husband, or child, or commits other violent acts. To portray 
these women as mad, turns them into less socially and politically disturbing figures. It 
enables the inquiry of the death of the child to end with the woman herself, and not to 
begin with society or motherhood in general, or anyone else. 
Further, these women's lenient "treatment", rather than punishment, serves to 
invalidate their actions and responsibility even more, and in tum, the potential power of 
all women's, actions. 158 This power is censored from public view and disguised as 
madness, in order that women comply with the myth of their passivity, compliance and 
harmlessness. The trend of psychological and medical treatment of women offenders is 
merely to ensure the reinforcement of these myths and traditional expectations, about 
the proper and desirable behaviour of women in our society. It is clear that the repeal of 
the crime of infanticide, as discussed above, will have little, or no, effect on the belief 
in these myths and the enforcement of them. 
The last price I identify here, though not the last by any means, is the denial of 
infanticidal mothers, and of other women's, capacity for violent acts and anger. The 
current treatment of infanticide signifies that all women wish, and society desires them, 
to fit within the traditional role of passive and nurturing wife and mother. This enables 
society to deny the possibility of serious female anger. l59 
154Above n 149, 85. 
155Above n 149, 81. 
156Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 216. 
l57see generally A Oakley Becoming a Mother - From Here to Maternity (Penguin Books, 
Middlesex, 1979) 
158Above n 149, 91. 
l59M Benn "Body Talk - The Sexual Politics of PMT" in Birch (ed), above n88, 163. Benn writes of 
women's anger in relation to premenstrual syndrome. She says it is believed that housewives who get 
irritated at domestic tasks, their husbands or their children are angry because of the time of the month, 
not because of anything within the dynamic of those relationships and certainly not because of 
disappointment or frustration. Any anger that women do feel is therefore explained away as merely 
hormonal. 
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To pathologise inf anticidal mothers because they kill their children is a very powerful, 
but very misleading portrayal of why women kill their children. The pathologisation of 
these women is misleading because they are far from "mad" in the psychological sense. 
They are perceived as pathological however, by society, because this is a convenient 
way of absolving society of the need to discover the real reasons why women kill their 
children. Hence, there is the strong desire to retain the medical model of the crime. 
The pathological representation of infanticidal mothers as mentally and biologically 
unstable, and as psychologically unbalanced, means that there is no need to look 
beyond these individually rooted explanations for the crime of infanticide. Nor is there 
the need to look beyond an explanation based on a false and mythologised perception of 
women and the nature of motherhood. There is also no need to acknowledge "the 
unpalatable truth that 'normal' women can kill their children when they are confronted 
by social and economic circumstances which are severe enough. "160 As this is the 
case, the real truth about infanticide will not be revealed. 
Criminologist Jocelynne Scutt says that infanticide is "clearly the 'band-aid' attitude of 
the criminal law towards socio-political problems created by role stereotyping." 161 
This, however, is not admitted by those who make and reform the law. It is now time 
to remove the "band-aid," to look beneath it, and begin to expose, explain and to 
understand the real reasons why women kill their children. In doing this, we will avoid 
the usual individual and biological explanations of the crime, and attack directly at the 
root of the problem. In doing so, we will attack the myths, the false expectations and 
the institutionalism of motherhood in the society in which we live. 
Katherine O'Donovan wrote, in 1984 that "[t]o admit that social and economic 
circumstances, or motherhood, may cause crime is to open a hitherto tightly closed 
box."162 In 1991, Ania Wilczynski wrote that, "[i]t is clearly time that the rusty hinges 
of this "box" were prised open" and, in 1993, I agree that to prise open this "box" is 
both a pressing and an urgent task. 163 It is a task, however, that is not easy and it is 
precisely for this reason, that it has taken so long already. Here, I attempt to begin the 
task, by opening the "box" up a crack. By doing this, I merely make a start on the long 
HiO Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 215 (Emphasis added). 
l6l J Scutt "Sexism in Criminal Law" in S Mukherjee and J Scull Women and Crime (Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 1981) 7. Scutt also argues that infanticide illustrates all too well the refusal of society 
to recognise the sexism inherent in our culture and endemic in the family unit as it exists under 
patriarchy. 
162Above n 12, 264. 
163 Above n 88, Wilczynski, 84. 
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road to beginning to understand the real reasons why women kill their children and in 
the hope that one day, the problem will be solved altogether. 
IX EXPOSING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CRIME OF 
INFANTICIDE. 
Infanticide is a crime that reflects not only a woman's mental state but also her 
experiences of helplessness and powerlessness as a result of being a mother in our 
society. 164 It is a response to her poverty, social isolation, loneliness, boredom, 
physical weariness, child care responsibilities and domestic duties, and her anger and 
self blame that she cannot feel better or do more. It reflects the "powerless 
responsibility" felt by mothers who stay at home to care for their children, and it 
evidences that anger at the conditions of motherhood can become translated into anger 
at the child. 165 The frequency of infanticide reflects the lack of any meaningful support 
services for mothers who experience these difficulties. Infanticide is a crime committed 
by some women who find it impossible to meet the culturally imposed standards of the 
perfect mother and fulfil the many myths of motherhood. 
Jenny Phillips identifies a number of these myths of motherhood in New Zealand. 166 
She suggests that they are that: (i) marriage brings happiness and fulfilment to women; 
(ii)it is essential for children to have their mothers at home for the first five years; (iii) 
the children of "working" mothers are badly off; and (iv) that child care centres are 
terrible places. She says another myth is that suburban neurosis is exaggerated, as most 
women at home are perfectly alright. 
These myths are very different from the reality that mothers face . There is a great 
conflict between the ideal of serene, fulfilled motherhood which is portrayed in the 
myths and the realities of isolation and exhaustion. Mothering is not a quality inherent 
in all women, but in fact, is something that must be learned. Since few women handle a 
small baby before they have their own, they learn on the job, and usually in isolation 
with very little emotional support. It is also likely that these women have little, or no, 
social or economic power to determine the environment in which their children will 
grow up in.167 In these circumstances it is likely that a new mother will exhaust herself 
l64 Above n 142, 86. 
165A Rich Of Woman Born (Bantam, New York, 1976) 35. 
1661 Phillips Mothers Matter Too -A Book for New 'Zealand Women at Home (Reed, Wellington, 
1983) 123-134. 
167see generally V Welburn Postnatal Depression (Fontana, London, 1980). 
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caring not only for her baby but also her other children, her partner and her home. Who 
mothers her ? 
The feelings of helplessness and powerlessness felt by mothers often manifest 
themselves in the condition known as postnatal depression. It is clear that postnatal 
depression in its most severe form may cause a woman to kill her child. 168 It is not just 
those mothers with puerperal pychosis that kill their children.169 This can be seen in 
the comments of one woman's experience of postnatal depression. She wrote that her 
experience of postnatal depression was about: l 70 
feeling hopeless, worthless, miserable and tired. It [was] about repressed anger which erupts 
as extreme irritability or is turned against the self in self-loathing and even physical attacks . It 
[was] about energy gone underground, flatness, greyness above ground. 
It is understandable that mothers suffering from this kind of depression may lash out at 
those more vulnerable than themselves. As Allison Morris and Ania Wilczynski write, 
within our societal structure where men hold all the power and women experience 
difficulty in living up to the expectation of "doing what comes naturally", " it is 
perhaps not surprising that the targets for [their] violence are those who are even less 
powerful than they are: their children." 171 
It may seem easy to remedy the conditions and problems that mothers face caring for 
their children and so, to prevent some of the causes of infanticide. However, there is a 
reluctance to acknowledge that for some women the experience of motherhood itself is 
what causes them to kill their children. This reluctance is obvious both in the legislature 
and in societal responses. 
This reluctance to accept that the conditions of motherhood cause infanticide exists 
because such an acknowledgement creates a direct threat to the institution of 
motherhood. Acceptance of these ideas threatens the nuclear family. Society will be 
further threatened, when women cast aside their role in the nuclear family and begin to 
choose the terms of their own lives. 172 
168see generally above n107. 
169see generally above n107. 
170y Welburn "Depression after Childbirth" cited in above n87, 13. 
171 Above n 88, Morris and Wilczynski, 216. They also write that if mothers are experiencing such 
obvious difficulty living up to the expectations of motherhood, we should ask why infanticide does not 
happen more often. 
172This can be seen for example by "collective parenting." One example of collective parenting is 
three women living in separate houses but together raising a "daughter." The "daughter" has her own 
room in each house and the women say that this means no one woman carries out the 24 hour 
responsibility of parenting. F.ach mother has different talents to contribute and the "daughter" always 
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This threat to the institution of motherhood and the family, is stopped by making the 
infanticidal mother into a 'scapegoat,' so hiding the fact that it is the society in which 
she lives that has failed her. As Adrienne Rich says: 1
73 
[I]nfanticidal mothers become a scapegoat - the one around whom the darkness of maternity is 
allowed to swirl - the invisible violence of the institution of motherhood, the guilt, the 
powerless responsibility for human lives, the judgements and condemnations, the fear of her 
own power, the guilt, the guilt, the guilt. 
Once society and the law accepts and integrates the reality that infanticidal mothers are 
merely 'scapegoats,' hiding a deeper problem about the conditions in the institution of 
motherhood, infanticide laws become redundant. Repeal of the crime of infanticide will 
be possible when adequate and easily obtainable support services, and whatever else it 
may take, are put into place to deal with the problems faced by mothers in society. 
Ideally, when all this is carried out there will be no need for infanticide law because the 
possibility of a woman killing her child, although not completely eliminated, will be 
lessened. 
The crime of infanticide will also no longer be needed because it will be understood that 
most women do not kill because they are, "mentally unstable, psychologically 
unbalanced [or] mentally aberrant". 174 It will be understood that women kill because 
1 
the stresses of being a mother in a society which undervalues, ignores and expects too 
much of them, become too great. It will be realised that women kill in "moments of 
murderous anger at their children because there is no one, or nothing else, on which to 
discharge their anger." 175 If the crime of infanticide is removed for these reasons, it 
will be for the right ones, and not for the admirable, but nevertheless, misguided 
reasons of the law reform bodies discussed earlier. 
176 
has a positive adult to relate to, while time is allowed for each adult to follow her own desires and
 
ambitions. This kind of family relationship challenges the foundations of the nuclear family. H, M
 
and D "New Model For Motherhood" (1993) 198 Broadsheet 16. 
173Above n 165,282. 
174Above n 161, 9. 
l 75 Above n 165, 5. 
176 Above n 6, Osbourne, 48 . Osbourne stresses the importance of the crime of infanticide being 
removed for the right reasons. She says, "the removal of [the crime] without concomitant change in
 
how people view female criminality may result in the law, the courts and public sentiment again 
moving out of step." She argues, "this is not to say that [they] should remain, but, rather they sho
uld 
be removed for the right reasons." 
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X CONCLUSION 
The treatment of infanticidal mothers in our courts and by the reform bodies discussed 
in this paper and the perceptions of these women in society invalidates their actions and 
instead lays the blame for the death of their children, not on the unrealistic expectations 
and pressures on mothers in our society today, but on the women themselves. Unless 
political and social change occurs to stem these unrealistic expectations and to change 
society's perceptions of inf anticidal mothers and why they kill their children, the blame 
for infanticide will rest, and all inquiries about the crime's causes will end with the 
mothers of these children. 
These false perceptions of the crime of infanticide must be challenged and the real 
reasons why women kill their children must be understood and integrated into our 
vision of reality. Most importantly however, these changes in perception must occur 
now, because there is a danger that the real reasons why women kill their children will 
remain contained in an unopened box, its hinges seized up completely by socio-political 
neglect. 
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